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Abstract 
 
This article argues that EU gender equality policy operates as a technology of biopolitical and 
neoliberal governmentality. Through a genealogical examination of EU policy documents and 
relevant demographic research, I examine how EU gender equality policy emerged as a means to 
reorganise women’s work and personal lives in order to optimise biological reproduction and 
capitalist productivity by simultaneously increasing women’s fertility and their labour market 
participation. Gender is argued to be an extension of the apparatus of sexuality as analysed by 
Foucault, enabling a more complex, expansive, and effective form of biopolitical regulation by 
promising to simultaneously reproduce life and economy. Moreover, gender is inseparable from the 
neoliberal context in which it is deployed as an ‘invisible hand’ targeted at empowering sexed subjects 
to self-manage and self-govern by making reproductive choices based on cost-benefit analyses of 
their personal and working lives. 
Key words: Foucault, neoliberalism, reproduction, biopolitics, European Union, reconciliation, 
fertility, human capital theory, gender 
 
 
Prophesies of the disastrous economic consequences of declining fertility and aging have acted 
ascatalysts for pushing gender equality policy forward in the European Union since the early 1990s 
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(Lewis 2006, 421; Stratigaki 2004, 36). Over the last twenty years, the European Commission has 
introduced policies for the ‘reconciliation of work and family life’ by developing childcare and 
parental leave and the flexibilisation of work as solutions to the apparently imminent threat of disaster 
brought on by the ‘demographic time bomb’ (Daly 2004; Stratigaki 2004). By the 2000s, gender 
mainstreaming was being promoted as a set of ‘measures to help achieve a better work/life balance 
[that] play a vital role in raising the employment rate’ (European Commission 2005, 13). Although 
feminist research has been good at critiquing the economic framing of gender equality initiatives 
(Teghtsoonian 2004; Woehl 2008), less attention has been given to the actual rationale underpinning 
the EU’s deployment of gender equality policy as an amenable demographic-economic policy 
instrument. What this article seeks to do, therefore, is to examine how gender equality has been 
transformed in EU policymaking into a ‘technology of power’ (Foucault 1991, 23) tailored to 
optimise the life and productivity of European populations.  
 
The entry of gender equality onto the EU’s agenda on the one hand can be seen as a success story of 
the feminist movement (e.g. Walby 2011). On the other hand, the measures introduced thus far have 
yet to produce the gender equal world the movement envisioned. Feminist scholars have attributed 
the unfinished state of gender equality to factors like the lack of political will, the unrelenting forces 
of capitalist appropriation, and institutional constraints (Lombardo and Meier 2008; Mazur 2007; 
Walby 2011). While there is no doubt truth in these analyses, this article  suggests that gender equality 
mechanisms are already invested with political rationalities that undermine its efficacy for 
emancipatory ends. It analyses gender equality as a mode of biopolitical and neoliberal 
governmentality, that is, modes of governance preoccupied with ‘conducting the conduct of men’ 
(Foucault 2008, 186) by ‘produc[ing] subjects, forms of citizenship and behaviour’ (Brown 2005, 37) 
to regulate and optimise the reproduction of labour and life. In such an analysis, gender is not taken 
as self-evident, but rather studied as a ‘technology of power’ that invests bodies with power, not solely 
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for purposes of control, but to render them forces of production (Foucault 1991, 23). Gender equality 
policy, I argue, is deeply biopolitical and gender is deployed therein as an apparatus of power for 
modifying human behaviour in accordance with neoliberal governmentality. 
 
Biopolitics, understood as a mode of politics characteristic to liberal modernity that takes biological 
life as the subject/object of governance, is a concept that has been analytically marginalised not only 
in gender equality scholarship but also in Foucauldian gender theory (Repo 2014) despite its centrality 
to Foucault’s history of sexuality in Will to Knowledge (1981). For Foucault, sexuality was the hinge 
that connected the discipline of the body to the regulation of population. As a response in part to the 
identification of population as a biological entity that was the source of economic productivity and 
competitiveness, it facilitated the concerted governance of biological reproduction and economic 
production through the ‘controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the 
readjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes’ (Foucault 1981, 141). To 
control the potential of biological existence required the rationalisation of phenomena specific to 
population, such as the monitoring of birth and death rates, emigration and immigration, disease and 
other health problems. The close-knit family became a prioritised social institution through which 
couples were educated to internalise the fiscal value of fertility to economic processes and were 
socialised to discipline their sexuality by either invigorating it or limiting it through birth control 
(1981, 104–5). 
 
Just as Foucault studied sexuality as an object of inquiry rather than a pre-existing artefact, this article 
asks how and through what rationalities of power the idea of gender has been deployed as a 
technology of biopolitics. In other words, rather than studying gender as the social construction of 
sex (Rubin 2011) or the performative repetitions of acts (Butler 1990), it is the idea of gender in itself 
and its strategic deployment that falls under scrutiny here. For Foucault, sexuality and sex were not 
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cultural constructions, but ‘historical formations, positivities or empiricities’ (Deleuze 2006: 41), or, 
eventualisations of thought that organise and discipline by ‘impos[ing] a particular mode of conduct 
on a particular human multiplicity’ (Deleuze 2006: 29). Rendering gender an object of analysis by 
theorising it in this manner does not entail making assumptions of what it ‘is,’ but rather involves 
examining the rationalities of power through which it emerges in the first place as a discourse 
amenable for deployment in governmental processes to govern the life and labour of human 
populations. 
 
By contrast to the Victorian era in which Foucault’s study of sexuality was situated, his work on 
neoliberalism provides a more germane context for the examination of gender, an idea that did not 
emerge until the 1950s (Germon 2009; Repo 2013). Neoliberal governmentality denotes the 
rationalities and practices of governance that seek to subject all social, political, and economic 
phenomena to the economic calculus by the extension of market values into everyday values and 
practices (Brown 2005, 40). Families become tasked with the responsibility to govern themselves in 
ways that will maximise the human capital of their members by cultivating them as active, calculating, 
consuming, and enterprising subjects (Rose 1998, 163). Indeed, the theory of human capital 
developed by US economists  such as Gary Becker, Israel Kirzner and Theodore W. Schultz, renders 
economic behaviour the grid of intelligibility by which social relationships and individual conduct 
become scrutinised and thus, governmentalised (Foucault 2008, 243, 252; Lemke 2011, 109). In this 
article I suggest that this is also central to the biopolitical deployment of gender. Human capital theory 
purports that all human decision-making can be understood in terms of ‘investment, capital costs, and 
profit – both economic and psychological’ (Foucault 2008, 244). Market rationality becomes the 
‘principle of decipherment of social relationships and individual behaviour’ (Foucault 2008, 243). 
For example, it assumes that women and men marry, divorce, go to work or have children according 
to an economic calculus, ‘investing’ their time and/or money based on the expected financial and/or 
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psychological costs. Direct interference is assumed to prevent individuals from exercising the 
capacity for rational decision making by limiting the number of choices available to them. The 
‘“invisible hand” of spontaneous market regulation’ (Lemke 2011, 109) ensures that individuals 
maximise their ability to weigh options in the marketplace, and in turn their decisions are assumed to 
be automatically beneficial for the broader society. Human capital theory is therefore an arm of 
neoliberal rationality that redefines the problem of human reproduction and the intelligibility of the 
intimate by taking an economic interest in the conduct of family relationships and reproductive 
behaviour. 
 
I argue that during the course of the 1990s and 2000s, the EU took up gender as a biopolitical 
technology of power for the control of human reproductive and economic behaviour  in line with the 
new neoliberal political and economic consensus that emphasised individual freedom, personal 
enterprise, freedom of choice, and self-realisation (Binkley 2011; Rose 2004, 137–66). Reconciliation 
is a key aspect of gender policy as it encapsulates a wide range of issues, such as the work and life 
balance, child care, parental leave, working arrangements and financial benefits for working parents, 
thus branching out to a number of policy areas (see Kantola 2010, 104). Although approximately half 
the policy documents analysed in this article concern demographic policy, their content frequently 
intersects with gender equality policy, which serves as further evidence of the close links between 
gender equality and population in EU policy. I argue that EU gender equality policy infused the idea 
of socially constructed sex (as ‘gender’) with the precepts of human capital theory to rationalise the 
re-optimisation of population and productivity, especially in the context of the reconciliation of work 
and family life,. 
 
The research material consists of key gender equality and demographic policy documents since the 
1993 enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty1, especially Green and White papers of the European 
6 
 
Commission, the institutional branch that manages and monitors EU gender equality policy. White 
Papers are documents containing proposals for Community action in a specific area, sometimes 
following a Green Paper, published to stimulate discussion on a given issue. The favourable reception 
of a White Paper by the European Council can lead to an action programme for the EU in the area in 
question. Both Green and White Papers are therefore preparatory and informative instruments that 
aim to lay down future strategies for action, but they are neither legally binding nor soft law 
instruments, although they are often used as alternatives to legislation (Senden 2004, 118–28). While 
the formation of the discourse of gender in these papers, in turn, can be seen as the result of a causal 
process of consultation between the Commission, experts, and civil society, the Foucauldian 
archaeological and genealogical methodology used here treats them as a part of the ‘heterogeneous 
ensemble’ that forms the apparatus (in this case, gender equality). The components that constitute it 
are in varying combinations, ‘discourses, institutions, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault 1980, 
194), elements that in the documents examined condition the possibility of the appearance of subjects, 
objects, and knowledges of gender, equality, and population. From this perspective, the importance 
of Green and White Papers derives not from the process that formed them, but from the kinds of 
knowledge that converge in them to condition the knowledge and practices of gender and gender 
equality as discursive formations. I examine how rationalities of power embedded in these documents 
mould gender equality into a biopolitical mechanism for optimising below-replacement level fertility 
rates whilst simultaneously promoting the industriousness of the adult population by modifying 
women’s reproductive and productive behaviour. 
 
This study does not aim to discredit the struggle of the feminist movement  but rather to grasp how 
gender equality policy in EU institutions has become so entwined with the neoliberal rationalities of 
contemporary biopolitical governmentality. I argue that the biopolitical deployment of gender through 
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neoliberal theories of human behaviour provides biopower, the form of power targeted at the level of 
life (Foucault 1981, 143), with new access to an array of social relations, multiplying and optimising 
the reach and utility of biopower in society. Moreover, the attempt to induce female subjects to ‘make 
choices’ that allow them to ‘free’ themselves from the antiquated baggage of gender roles to both 
reproduce the species and capital reflects not only the context of neoliberal governmentality into 
which the gender discourse has now entered, but also the ways in which these changes are in complex 
tension with welfare logics. 
 
The first section sketches the broader economic and demographic rationalities underpinning the 
rationality of gender equality apparent in EU policy discourse. This entails examining the shift from 
welfare towards neoliberal governmentality and its implications for social governance. The second 
section examines key Western demographic research produced in the 1990s and 2000s on declining 
fertility in order to grasp the underlying scientific discourses that tied gender equality to population, 
fertility, and the market economy, transforming gender equality into a technology of biopolitical 
governance. As EU gender equality policy paradoxically entails little concrete intervention into the 
lives of women and men, yet rhetorically advocates changes in gender roles throughout various policy 
fields through gender mainstreaming, the final section suggests that gender is now deployed as an 
‘invisible hand’ through which sexed individuals are subtly encouraged to manage and regulate their 
reproductive and productive labour that, in accordance with neoliberal human capital theory, should 
benefit the life of the whole populace. 
 
Bioeconomic Renewal and the Crisis of the Welfare State 
 
While the issue of declining fertility was flagged by demographers in the 1970s, it was not until the 
1990s that it became engrained in political discourse. In the 1994 White Paper on ‘European Social 
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Policy’, the Commission of the European Communities stated that ‘the globalisation of trade and 
production, the huge impact of new technologies on work, society and individuals, the aging of the 
population and the persistent high level of unemployment are all combining to put unprecedented 
strains on the economic and social fabric of all the Member States’ (European Commission 1994, 1). 
Europe’s aging population and declining fertility combined with high unemployment and pressures 
of global competition purportedly jeopardised the  feasibility of the welfare model. The White Paper 
sought to provide instruments for the development of a ‘European Social Model’ that tackled Europe’s 
high unemployment rates and social exclusion by investing in education and improving job 
opportunities and social cohesion, whilst bolstering the market economy and protecting the rights of 
the individual.  
The centrality of demographic problems is apparent throughout the document. The first sentence of 
the preface stated that ‘Europe is living through a period of profound change’, elaborating in the next 
paragraph that ‘the globalisation of trade and production, the huge impact of new technologies on 
work, society and individuals, the ageing of the population and the persistent high level of 
unemployment are all combining to put unprecedented strains on the economic and social fabric of 
all the Member States’ (European Commission 1994, 1).  
The 1994 White Paper on European Social Policy exemplifies the crux of the biopolitical dilemma 
that emerged in the beginning of the decade. It questioned whether the welfare model could keep on 
‘providing cash benefits through the redistribution of income, shouldered to a large extent by an ever 
declining active population – without preparing them or encouraging them sufficiently to contribute 
to economic activity’ (European Commission 1994, 4). Fertility declined as the baby boom generation 
retired, producing ‘significant changes in [the EU’s] demographic structure within the next 20 years’ 
(European Commission 1994, 35).  As a consequence, in the near future, the shrinking working 
population of many European countries would not produce the taxable income required to run 
European welfare regimes. The White Paper put the welfare model and its foundational socio-political 
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principles of social protection and wealth redistribution in tension with the material and structural 
‘realities’ of a changing demographic and economic situation. 
 
While neoliberal principles conflict with welfare logics by undermining the latter’s social democratic 
principles (e.g. Walby 2011, 113–6), neoliberal and welfare governmental reason can also be seen as 
competing tactical discourses on the regulation of life and economy. In the Birth of Biopolitics 
lectures, Foucault argued that inherent to the welfare economy was the implementation of social 
policy to allegedly counter the ‘destructive effects on society’ (Foucault 2008, 142) such as inequality 
that accompany uncontrolled economic growth. Foucault suggested, however, that welfare was not 
about achieving equality, but managing inequality for the secure pursuit of economic production, to 
‘reduce the costs of the economy by pacifying social conflicts by enabling wage claims to be less 
steep and pressing’ (Foucault 2008, 199). While capitalism endows life with value, a move that forms 
the basis of wage calculation, the mechanism of social security integrates the means of pacifying 
bodies for productive labour into the wage itself. 
 
This kind of Foucauldian analysis complicates the postulation that ‘good’ welfare structures are being 
replaced by ‘bad’ neoliberal principles (Walby 2011). The management of inequality and societal, 
economic and personal uncertainty under welfare schemes for the better production of wealth and 
management of life is a reminder that welfare state is born out of the surplus value produced by the 
labouring body to maintain the surplus (or, non-working) population and is therefore functional to 
capitalist accumulation (Hewitt 1983, 77). The rationalities of welfare and neoliberal economy are 
therefore constituted through the related capitalist and biopolitical rationalities that are at times each 
other’s rivals, territorialised as they are with different tactical elements and operative intensities. The 
main strategic difference between the welfare and neoliberal governmentality is in the latter’s ‘intent 
to efface the boundaries between the spheres of production and reproduction, labour and life, the 
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market and living tissues, the very boundaries that were constitutive of welfare state biopolitics and 
human rights discourse’ (Cooper 2008, 9). This means that instead of securing social life to safeguard 
capitalist production against the fluctuations of financial capital, neoliberalism scratches out the 
boundaries customary to liberal thought and radically reorganises the social according to free-market 
economic logics. The strict divisions between public/private, production/reproduction, labour/life, 
and market/society around which the welfare state was organised are effaced in radical 
reconfiguration of social, economic, and personal life. 
 
Tensions between welfare and neoliberal economic discourses are apparent in the White Paper on 
European Social Policy. On the one hand, it urged the European Union to ‘consolidate and build on 
the achievements of the past’ in social policy and ‘to preserve and develop the European social 
model… to give the people of Europe the unique blend of economic well-being, social cohesiveness 
and high overall quality of life’ (European Commission 1994, 1). At the same time, the paper 
deliberated on how to create a ‘well-educated and highly motivated adaptable working population’ as 
the Union’s ‘key resource’ for meeting the challenge of moving ‘towards an efficient, quality-based 
economy with a high rate of investment in new technologies’ (European Commission 1994, 4). The 
White Paper proceeded with an instrumental rationale that emphasised the importance of social 
cohesion for economic restructuring: 
 
This is not just a question of social justice; the Union simply cannot afford to lose the 
contribution of marginalised groups to society as a whole. At a time when major technological, 
economic, and social changes are increasing the insecurity of a growing number of people, 
the Union needs to ensure that the most vulnerable… are not excluded from the benefits of – 
and from making an active contribution to – the economic strength of a more integrated 
Europe. (European Commission 1994, 37). 
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 In other words, welfare rationale and neoliberal economics were in tension through their different 
responses to the challenges posed by population ageing, changing family patterns, high levels of 
unemployment, changes in the modes of production, and social exclusion, which threatened the 
social, economic and personal well-being of European citizens. At the same time, while the Union 
could not ‘afford’ to squander human resources lost through social exclusion and poor economic 
structuring, states could not be expected to cover the costs of ensuring the social protection schemes 
designed to provide those excluded from labour markets with the necessary support:. ‘the traditional 
social protection systems of Europe – based on the concept of the welfare state – are an important 
achievement that needs to be maintained. But it is also clear that there needs to be a move away from 
more passive income maintenance measures toward active labour market measures’ (European 
Commission 1994, 35). The White Paper therefore recommended shifting these costs to subject/object 
individuals  by transforming them into active economic subjects. 
 
In particular, economic and personal well-being relied on the willingness of a motivated and flexible 
female population to ‘maximise their potential contributions’ (European Commission 1994, 31). 
Women were seen as flexible and creative individuals whose productive risk-taking potential should 
not be squandered. As the White Paper stated, the ‘adaptability and creativity of women is a strength 
that should be harnessed to the drive for growth and competitiveness in the EU’ (European 
Commission 1994, 31). Gender equality policy was the means by which women could be mobilised 
to boost the capitalist economy through their self-transformation into  entrepreneurs and job seekers. 
While increased flexibility undoubtedly benefits some individuals, as David Harvey (2007, 75–6) 
notes, the asymmetries of power today are such that flexibility has become a useful method of creating 
more adaptable means of accumulating capital at the expense of lower wages, increased job security, 
as well as the loss of benefits and job protections. The neoliberal predilection to reduce all aspects of 
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social policy to a cost-benefit analysis and to develop institutional practices for enacting this vision 
(Brown 2005, 40) is also apparent in the view that the support of women’s rights ‘should be 
underpinned by an evaluation of the economics of equal opportunity, especially the costs of not 
applying equal opportunity policy’ (European Commission 1994, 31, emphases added). Gender 
equality was an central economic policy, rather than a merely social one, as ‘the contribution which 
women can make to the revitalising of the economy is one of the reasons why the issue of equality 
should be seen as a key element to be taken into account in all relevant mainstream policies’ 
(European Commission 1994, 31). 
 
The Commission’s view was therefore that women were too bound by domestic and childcare duties 
to engage in the market economy, and as such were a squandered economic resource. Moreover, 
addition to the problem of aging, the Commission expressed concern  that ‘family patterns are 
changing: larger number of families are being formed outside marriage, people are having children 
later and partnerships are often less stable’ (European Commission 1994, 35). Not only were women 
devoted exclusively to childcare duties unproductive, but the conventional institution of the family 
was crumbling and young couples were having children later if at all. Population ageing put even 
more pressure on women’s care responsibilities. Dealing with these issues, the Commission wrote 
‘will require new thinking on many issues that have been taken for granted until now, such as 
traditional career patterns, retirement age and the role of the nuclear and extended family’  (European 
Commission 1994: 39). Owing to ‘the lack of prospects for new entrants to the labour market’ 
(European Commission 1994: 9) and the lack of opportunities to reconcile work and family life, 
women performed satisfactorily neither on the labour market nor the reproductive/care front. Equally 
problematic, however, were the mothers who left working life permanently to care for their children. 
The Commission’s gender equality policy thus proposed that ‘European efforts should be redoubled 
to develop actions and policies which reinforce women’s rights and maximise their potential 
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contributions’ (European Commission 1994, 31). The origins of the economic problems of 
demographic change were therefore located social and economic structural problems that negatively 
affected the work and family life balance of heterosexual couples, with a particular focus on the 
uneven and inefficient distribution of women’s labour capacities. 
 
Having problematised the situation thus, the Commission set out to  harness women’s reproductive 
capacities and their labour market potential according to the new needs of ‘adaptability and creativity’ 
(European Commission 1994, 31). To develop such a strategy, the Commission decided to monitor 
the demographic situation in Europe and  assess its impact on society and the economy. It would 
produce a ‘regular report on demography in the EU’ that would ‘illustrate the ways in which 
demography – in the short and longer term – will impact on and interrelate with social and economic 
policy’ (European Commission 1994, 35). Since women’s use of their reproductive and productive 
time relative to men’s was identified as the problem, gender equality understood thus was born as a 
key field of knowledge for the EU. Gender equality policy therefore emerged as a bioeconomic 
mechanism of neoliberal governmentality that, in line with neoliberal rationale, sought to encourage 
citizens to assume the role of self-responsibilised workers and consumers (Giroux 2008, 590). 
 
The Science and Technology of Gender Equality 
 
At the same time that the EU started to propose gender equality as a solution to declining fertility in 
the 1990s, a growing number of scholars across the social and population sciences (e.g. Andersson 
2000; Chesnais 1998; Duvander, Lappegard and Andersson 2010; Hoem 1993; Hoem and Hoem 
1996; Kravdal 1996; McDonald 2000; Neyer 2003; Oláh and Bernhardt 2008) argued that advancing 
gender equality would have a positive effect on European fertility and productivity. Many of these 
scholars worked as advisors to the European Commission and other governmental bodies, thus 
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disseminating their research findings  to policy-planners and policy-makers across Europe. In this 
section I therefore examine widely cited demographic research on gender equality and family policy  
published in international demography journals in the 1990s and 2000s2 for the light they shed on the 
epistemic politics of ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault 2008, 18) behind gender equality as a policy solution 
to declining fertility. 
 
Before the 1990s, demographers understood the relationship between gender equality and fertility in 
two different ways. In the context of international development, gender equality was seen to have a 
‘positive’ effect because led to lower fertility rates believed to be necessary for industrialisation (e.g. 
Cain, Khanam and Nahar 1979). In the Western context, however, women’s participation in the 
workforce was linked to a ‘negative’ decline in fertility(e.g. Becker 1981). Yet in the 1980s Sweden 
was able to combine gender equality with above replacement-level fertility rates, prompting 
demographers and social scientists  to start to differentiate between different levels of gender equality, 
the level of economic development, and their relation to fertility. In a move away from the 
dichotomous model of ‘more or less’ gender equality, Australian demographer Peter McDonald 
(2000) analysed levels of gender equality in different institutional and policy settings,  concluding 
that it is neither simply ‘too much’ nor ‘too little’ gender equality in general that led to low fertility. 
Instead, once a degree of gender equality outside the home in highly industrialised countries caused 
an initial drop in fertility, this would fall even lower if gender inequality within the family persisted. 
This phenomenon is known as the ‘second demographic transition’ (Lesthaeghe 2010, 211). While 
changes in women’s rights  in property, suffrage, education, equal pay and employment opportunities 
‘represent radical or revolutionary change’, according to McDonald, ‘progress towards gender equity 
within the family and hence family-oriented institutions has continued to advance very slowly’ (2000, 
436), which led him to conclude that ‘when gender equity rises to high levels in individual-oriented 
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institutions while remaining low in family-oriented institutions, fertility will fall to very low levels’ 
(McDonald 2000, 437). Thus the ‘mainstreaming’ of gender into family policy  was crucial. 
 
Demographers and social scientists thus focused their attention on how to best regulate ‘gender 
equality’ in the family  to optimise both reproduction and production. For example, German 
demographer Gerda Neyer’s (2003) examination of maternal protection, parental leave and childcare 
services and benefits concluded that a gender equal application of family policy  was the most 
effective format for increasing fertility. Other measures, such as financial incentives for each added 
child, had contrasting results. While they ‘did not have a noticeable impact on the total fertility level’ 
in Austria, in France and Britain it had ‘a clear effect… on the progression to third births and the 
timing of birth’ (Neyer 2003, 79). Similarly, the provision of childcare services was not seen as 
influential in case studies of Norway or West Germany (Kravdal 1996). In Norway, the availability 
of childcare was positively correlated to having a third child, but not the first or second. Based on this 
observation, Kravdal concluded that increasing private and public childcare would have ‘little 
stimulating effect on fertility’ (1996, 201). Nevertheless, research on paternal leave in Sweden 
suggested that if fathers took paternal leave with their first child, they were more likely to have a 
second child than those who did not. Likewise the length of maternity leave increased the possibility 
of second and third births. Thus if both ‘fathers and mothers are not given sufficient opportunities to 
balance production and reproduction,’ concluded Holter (2007, 247), ‘fertility will suffer.’ In other 
words, while mechanisms such as childcare provision or financial support for families had varying 
effects on fertility, the ability for parents to reconcile work and family life was seen as the crucial 
factor for stimulating birth rates. 
 
The Swedish case has been cited by demographers since the 1990s for its ability to combine high 
levels of gender equality with near-replacement level fertility. German demographer Jan M. Hoem 
16 
 
used the Swedish case to argue that there was ‘a direct causal effect of [family] policy reform on 
demographic behaviour’ (Hoem 1993, 19). Hoem suggested that following the Swedish introduction 
of a ‘speed premium’ extending parental leave benefits past the birth of the first child in the 1980s, 
‘parents reacted by increasing their fertility’ (Hoem 1993, 19).  Danish sociologist Esping-Andersen 
argued that ‘without an adequate supply of family care services, women’s entry into the labour market 
may still rise (as it does), but at the long-term cost of low fertility’ (Esping-Andersen 1996b, 83). The 
welfare state enabled the family ‘to harmonise work and family objectives’ by ensuring that ‘social 
services and liberal provisions for leave are available’ (Esping-Andersen 1996a, 7) to them. 
Reconciliation was a significant technology of power because it unified the previously separate 
Malthusian variables of reproduction and production and subsumed them under the same technology 
of biopower. While in the past ‘it [was] often feared that female employment will jeopardise fertility, 
and thus aggravate the aging crisis’ now reconciliation made it possible for ‘female employment and 
fertility [to be] record-high [as] in Scandinavia’ (Esping-Andersen 1996a, 7). Reconciliation promised 
to simultaneously mobilise, discipline, and harness both the reproductive and productive capacities 
of the female body. 
 
 
 
With a renewed focus on family policy, population research thus began to target the unequal division 
of labour between men and women in the household as the main structural discrepancy hindering 
fertility growth in highly industrialised liberal democracies. Therefore, while tax benefits and 
childcare were acknowledged as important, reconciliation was identified as the crucial element of any 
policy solution. While tax benefits could increase fertility, they alone did not encourage women to 
return to the labour market (Chesnais 1998). It also required the provision of parental leave with the 
guarantee of the right to return to the workforce afterwards.  
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Modifying Reproductive Behaviour Through the Invisible Hand of Gender 
 
In what follows, I examine the processes of power/knowledge through which EU gender equality 
policy and gender mainstreaming became entangled with not only with neoliberal strategies of 
governance (Griffin 2009, 132–6; Squires 2007, 138–43; Teghtsoonian 2004; Woehl 2008), but also 
biopolitical strategies that subscribe to the neoliberal logic of human capital. I suggest that gender 
equality and demographic policy together aim to induce European citizens to become ‘entrepreneurs 
of themselves, shaping their own lives through the choices they make among the forms of life 
available to them’ (Rose 1989, 230), in the attempt to persuade them to self-regulate their reproductive 
and productive behaviour. In this context gender has been taken up as an apparatus of biopower in 
the attempt to influence reproductive behaviour and decision-making. 
 
The drive to increase both women’s fertility and employment gained momentum in the EU’s policy 
agenda as the new millennium opened. The 2000 Lisbon Strategy defined the EU’s economic 
objective to ‘become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ 
(European Council 2000). As Hermann and Hofbauer (2007, 129–30) have argued, the Lisbon 
Strategy broke ground by accelerating the deployment of the European social model ‘in the argument 
for the radical restructuring and restricting of existing European welfare systems’. It was taken as the 
main framework for ‘innovative measures to support the [fertility] rate and judicious use of 
immigration [so that] Europe can create new opportunities for investment, consumption and creation 
of wealth’ (European Commission 2005, 10). The 2002 Barcelona targets for increased access to 
childcare, the 2006 European Pact for Gender Equality, and the Commission’s 2006-2010 Gender 
Equality Roadmap were also framed as tools to ‘meet the demographic challenge’ by achieving the 
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goals of the Lisbon Strategy and the European Employment Strategy (European Commission 2007a, 
11). These documents strengthened the the rationale that linked together gender equality, fertility and 
‘economic and social cohesion, sustainable growth and competitiveness’ (European Commission: 
2010b, 3). 
 
Measures to enable work-life balance were comprised mainly of non-binding recommendations of 
policy tools3 that endorsed the creation of incentives for women and men to make different life 
choices. The Commission argued that the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy was essential to 
enable the self-mobilised and flexible employment of women, who would bring ‘innovation’ and 
‘productivity’ (European Commission 2005, 2). As  the 2005 Commission Green Paper on 
‘Confronting demographic change’ makes clear, what this effectively meant was influencing the way 
couples made ‘working and family life choices’ (European Commission 2005, 3). This was premised 
on the belief that all women and men wanted to have children, but that they were ‘discouraged from 
doing so by all kinds of problems that limit their freedom of choice’ (European Commission 2005, 
2), which could be corrected by mainstreaming gender into the social policy. Because ‘these 
decisions… have an impact on the economy and society’, the Commission reasoned  that it was ‘in 
everyone’s interest to offer genuine choices equally for women and men throughout the different 
stages of their lives’ (European Commission 2010a, 3). The feminist struggle for work/life balance 
was therefore carefully reinvented biopolitically as a question of individual freedom in life’s 
marketplace of choice. 
 
What was striking about the ‘Strategy for equality’ was that it problematised ‘gender roles’ as the 
factor that ‘continue[s] to influence crucial individual decisions on education, on career paths, on 
working arrangements, on family and on fertility’ (European Commission 2010a, 3). It was therefore 
the degree to which roles affected the choices available to women and men that was the problem. The 
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lack of flexible working hours and care services left women overburdened  with family 
responsibilities (European Commission 2006a, 2). 
 
More specifically, gender roles were identified as a key variable that obstructed the ability of sexed 
individuals to make cost-benefit analyses in their everyday lives. Gender roles were therefore seen as  
determining the capacity of men and women to modify their reproductive activity. The main line of 
argument was that the socially acceptable forms of sexually codifed behaviour (as ‘gender’) were too 
limited for men and women to be sufficiently reproductive and productive.  According to the 
Commission, ‘rigid gender roles can hamper individual choices and restrict the potential of both men 
and women’ (European Commission 2010a, 10) and thus impact fertility rates and economic 
competitiveness. In this sense, European women and men were assumed to be the rational-economic 
actors of neoliberal governmentality  ‘respond[ing] systematically to modifications in the variables 
of the environment’ (Foucault 2008, 270) through cost/benefit decision-making processes. Indeed, in 
neoliberal governmentality what needs to be governed is not the individual, but rather that the 
individual is governable through environmental variables. It would appear that a version of gender in 
line with sex/gender theory was deployed to govern those environmental variables and thus regulate 
re/productive human behaviour. Sex/gender as a theory of human capital involved reducing sex to the 
status of a neutral material manifestation of biology that had no bearing on the ability of individuals 
to make choices, and gender as a set of environmental or socio-cultural factors that either strained or 
worked in favour of the capacity for sexed individuals to make choices. The sex/gender split thus 
became internalised by human capital rationale as a bioeconomic mechanism. 
 
It is worth noting, however, that the EU did not advocate the elimination of gender roles, but their 
relaxation so as to enable women and men to perform a broader range of behaviours in their working 
and intimate lives. ‘Rigid gender roles’  were not necessarily those that were oppressive, but those 
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that restricted individual life-choice making. By changing them, the Commission hoped to ‘promote 
genuine opportunities for both women and men to enjoy a work-life balance’ (European Commission 
2010b, 3). The Commission therefore did not endorse a genderless world, but rather one where social 
construction of behavioural imperatives was liberated from ‘rigidity’ and optimised to ‘contribute 
thus both to the realisation of family plans and the employment of women’ (European Commission 
2007b, 5). Gender should not be eradicated but deployed and manipulated, because it was the 
‘invisible hand’ that ‘draws together the threads of all these dispersed interests’ (Foucault 2008, 279), 
in this case: behaviour, fertility, and economy. 
 
Human capital theory not only assumes that individuals use economic reasoning to make decisions 
based on cost/benefit analysis, but also that those decisions can be manipulated through the provision 
of incentives designed to stimulate responses from individuals based on their ‘desires, values, and 
identities’ (Giroux 2008, 591). As such, Commission documents also referred to the need to provide 
couples with the right conditions to modify their behaviour in a way that would increase fertility and 
female labour force participation. The policies of reconciliation such as family benefits, parental 
leave, child care, and equal pay were no longer welfare provisions, but ‘incentives’ that Member 
states could offer to facilitate a competitive economic climate (European Commission 2005, 5; 
Harvey 2007, 80). Thus in gender equality policy too, the state becomes governmentalised as a 
neoliberal co-conspirator in the design to produce rational economic behaviour in every member of 
society (Brown 2005, 41, 44) by offering benefits and services that are deemed to encourage women 
to have children and return to work soon after. 
 
As discussed earlier, many of these ‘incentives’ come in the form of  elements of the welfare state 
that are being retained and refurbished on the terms of neoliberal economics. While the demographers 
discussed in the previous section spoke of the Swedish welfare state as a system, EU gender equality 
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and demographic policy distanced itself from the welfare discourse in favour of discussing individual 
policies like parental leave, tax benefits and childcare that could be developed to stimulate 
demographic and economic revitalisation. Policies originally introduced under the welfare system are 
therefore being  refashioned to fit the biopolitical imperatives of neoliberal governmentality - from 
insurance against economic uncertainties and protection against social exclusion to choice and 
competition. Deleuze and Guattari remind us that capitalism is constantly recoding, ‘decoding and 
axiomatising flows in order to extract surplus value from them’ whereby ‘everything returns or recurs: 
States, nations, families’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 37) albeit under new strategic configurations. 
From this perspective the de/recoding of the welfarist elements of reconciliation into the neoliberal 
economy is not due to a fault in neoliberal governmentality, but is rather one of the many 
contradictions through which neoliberal rationality operates (Harvey 2007, 77–80). 
 
The EU directives on gender equality in the 1990s and 2000s thus largely focused on providing 
women with incentivesto combine work and family life. The 1996 Parental Leave Directive stipulated 
that mothers and fathers be provided with a minimum of three months’ benefits on the arrival of a 
child by birth or adoption. The 1997 Part-Time Workers Directive prescribed equal treatment, pay 
and working conditions for full-time and part-time workers. The deployment of gender as an invisible 
hand has meant that aside from certain initiatives  to create some possibilities for women to 
reconfigure their work-life balance, very little else has been done to advance gender equality. 
Neoliberal governmentality operates paradoxically too in its ‘trajectory of intensification’ (Read 
2009, 29): neoliberal technologies of power intervening in human fertility are less restrictive and less 
corporeal than in the past (for example compared to forced sterilisations and eugenic marriage laws 
in the first half of the twentieth century).,At the same time, they target the totality of the human body, 
mind and behaviour directly by encouraging women to self-govern  modifying their reproductive and 
productive behaviour through subtle interventions into the gender order. 
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The ability of ‘gender’ as a technology of power to accommodate the flexibility and adaptability 
demanded by neoliberal governmentality is also apparent in the European Commission’s attempt to 
make allowances for contextual variation. In 2007 the Commission reported that each Member State 
needed to find the ‘successful policy mix’ (European Commission 2007a, 75) suited to its specific 
societal needs to enable the ‘reconciliation’ of work and family life. Demographers still purported 
that ‘replacement fertility can be achieved in an egalitarian gender structure’ (Matthews 1999, 21), 
but politically the kind of policies required to implement gender equality and hence increase fertility 
needed to be adjusted to the state of gender equality in a given country. Fertility rates varied 
considerably among Member States, the highest being in North-western Europe and the Nordic 
countries and lowest in Southern and Eastern Member States.4 Benefits like parental leave allowances 
were already in place in many Member States when the EU Directives came into force, but not in 
others. Also, there are big differences between Member States in the area of childcare, oscillating 
between privatised childcare in most countries and state supported care in a minority of mostly Nordic 
countries (cf. Kantola 2010, 116–8).  
 
For the Commission, the different social and political structures of Member States meant each  had 
to find the right  gender equality policy mix to ‘unlock the potential for more births’ (European 
Commission 2007a, 75) mainly through some combination of: a) financial support (mainly cash 
benefits or tax breaks), b) access to services (parental leave, childcare, preschool) and c) flexible 
working conditions (flexible working hours, narrowing the pay gap, more part-time employment for 
women). For example, Southern European and North-western European couples were seen require 
different kinds of reproductive incentives not only because their fertility rates differed, but also 
because varying family systems and welfare structures meant couples had different reasons for not 
procreating. In other words, , the country-specific arrangements of sex/gender difference requiredan 
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individually tailored gender equality apparatus. In this context, equality is revealed as a contextually 
supple technology for the regulation of difference. It can be applied in a number of ways according 
to the perceived status quo of difference in a given society, as well as the desired outcome. ‘Equality’ 
comes to mean the ability of men and women to have the same degree of freedom of choice to take 
risks with their lifestyles and livelihoods according to their interests. Paradoxically, then, in order to 
regulate sex and hence optimise fertility, the intervention into gender by political agents must be 
prohibited and subjects are entreated to take responsibility and govern their own lives. 
 
Gender is an equally flexible apparatus of power. Through gender, biopower multiplies the means 
and contexts in which sex can be regulated. By manipulating socio-cultural (gender), biopower can 
better govern the human organism (sex), and hence, life. When the technologies of gender and 
equality are combined, the regulation of gender becomes reoriented through a mode of 
governmentality specifically developed to govern difference in ways experts deem favourable for the 
optimisation of life. 
 
Governing Life Through Gender 
 
I have argued that since the 1990s, a new mode of re-optimising the life function has been under 
development in the EU under the guise of gender equality policy. The EU’s neoliberal vision for ‘a 
productive and dynamic Europe’ (European Commission 2006b, 10) expects women to replace the 
retiring male workforce by joining the labour market whilst at the same time reproducing the next 
generation of wage-earners. These interventions are enacted through ‘gender equality,’ which is being 
extended to ever more diverse areas of the lives of the population through gender mainstreaming. 
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In the demographic and social scientific quest to discover the possible  social problems that caused 
fertility decline in Western Europe, demographers and policy makers did not limit themselves to 
monitoring historical trends or life processes, but rather focused on understanding human behaviour, 
assumed to be determined by economic decision-making. The EU has not used this data to enforce 
repressive or prohibitive measures. Rather  the EU’s approach is grounded in the ostensibly 
emancipatory discourses of equality, prosperity, individual freedom, choice, and personal self-
fulfilment through which it aims to persuade women and men to modify their behaviours so that their 
life courses better correspond to the biopolitical and neoliberal governmental imperatives. 
 
The idea of gender itself is at the heart of this strategy. Here the EU’s use of the gender term is not a 
merely a politically correct synonym for sex. In its policy texts, gender is articulated as something 
produced through the socialisation of (sexed) individuals into gender roles. In drawing on the idea of 
sex/gender, therefore, sex is understood as functional matter, in other words, the biological facts and 
bodily capacities that make sexual reproduction possible. Rather than trying to control sex directly, 
the EU aims to tap into gender, the socially produced sexed behaviours and desires that determine 
how individuals make use of their sex. EU gender equality policy formulates gender as an invisible 
hand that guides individuals’ decision-making processes. Restrictive gender roles can obstruct the 
availability of life options for the interest-driven human and are therefore an affront to the freedom 
of choice from which society as a whole may suffer. The objective of gender equality policy is 
therefore not to remove gender roles, but  to allow individuals to make allegedly better, more rational 
choices for the benefit of the species and the economy. If Foucault described how ‘relations of 
power… established [sexuality] as a possible object’ (1981, 98) in the nineteenth century, the 
documents examined here suggest that gender is the most recent apparatus of biopower, 
complementing and extending (but not replacing) the apparatus of sexuality in order to access human 
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decision-making processes that bear upon the life courses of individuals so carefully scrutinised by 
demographers. 
 
Gender is therefore being deployed now as a biopolitical apparatus in a similar fashion that sexuality 
was upon its deployment in the nineteenth century. The deployment of gender cannot be detached 
from its operational context of neoliberal governmentality any more than sexuality could be from the 
rise of bourgeois society in the nineteenth century (Foucault 1981, 69). The subject of gender equality 
is a self-examining and self-governing rational-economic subject. By applying economic language to 
the discussion of women’s and men’s personal life choices, neoliberal governmentality shifts the 
responsibility for governing fertility and economy to individuals themselves, who must engage in 
techniques of self-inspection, calculation, and self-governance. Women in particular are rendered 
responsible for both fertility and productivity, and hence, the well-being and prosperity of society. 
 
Gender equality is responds to the needs of neoliberal governance as a flexible and expansive 
mechanism of power. In addition to transforming and unifying the biopolitical technologies that 
regulate production and reproduction, reconciliation policies  encompass a whole host of social, 
economic, and personal relations. Reconciliation not only regulates the personal relationships 
between women and men, but also the family unit as a whole, as well as society’s organisation of 
reproduction and production, life and capital, as well as the relations between human bodies and 
health and welfare authorities, children and their carers and educators, and employers and employees. 
Reconciliation gathers all of these relations under the same field of power/knowledge and renders 
them reachable through a single biopolitical mechanism of gender equality. The gender equality 
apparatus therefore provides biopower with access to an unprecedented set of relations through the 
scientific measurement and assessment of the social relations surrounding the heterosexual couple. 
In its aim to include gender in a range of policy fields, gender mainstreaming also holds the potential 
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to extend the reach of biopower to potentially countless aspects of social life. Gender mainstreaming 
as a biopolitical technology tracks, processes and controls the varying forces of reproduction ‘by 
modulating all divergences of information’ whereby it is also able to change ‘its activity of selection 
from one moment to the next’ (Parisi 2004, 133). As ‘gender’ can be discovered virtually anywhere 
in the social field, the biopolitical technology of ‘gender equality’ can be instituted in countless areas 
of life, legitimising and enabling the biopolitical control deemed necessary in that area. 
 
For Foucault, sexuality was a discursive event rather than an identity, preference or desire. Gender 
too can be figured as a discursive event. Sexuality was a discursive event because it emerged as ‘an 
area of investigation’ (Foucault 1981, 98) and was formed ‘a multiplicity of discursive elements that 
can come into play in various strategies’ (Foucault 1981, 100). Sexuality became a ‘will to truth’ with 
‘a history’ (Foucault 1981, 79) rooted in biological, psychological and demographic truths about the 
life of human kind in a way that radically transformed the strategies and tactics of power relations. 
The same can be said for gender. Gender had purposeful, strategic ‘laws of construction’ (Foucault 
1972, 30) in its separation of impartial, functional material sex from the socio-cultural normative 
realm of gender. The deployment of gender had specific ‘conditions of existence’ (Foucault 1972, 28) 
in the political-demographic problematisation of fertility and economy in Europe. Gender as a 
discursive formation and apparatus of biopower is specific to this period and context alone. In the 
context of the EU’s demographic and gender equality policies, the idea of gender constitutes nothing 
less than the deployment of a new technology of power to understand, measure, regulate, and optimise 
human fertility, economy and life. 
 
 
Notes 
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1 The Maastricht Treaty’s Protocol on Social Policy dedicated a clause for the European Community 
to help ‘support and complement the activities of the Member States’ in a number of fields including 
‘work on equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment 
at work’ (European Union 1992, 37), thus furthering the protection of gender equality in an expanding 
EU. 
2 Many of these scholars are from the Nordic countries and have worked together in different 
combinations on research articles and alongside their academic work act as expert advisors to bodies 
like RAND Corporation, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. Understanding 
the rationale underpinning their work is therefore highly significant not only as a background or 
parallel discourse to the EU discourse, but because this research has also informed the shape that 
discourse has taken. 
3 The Gender Equality Roadmap, for example, is ‘an example of traditional soft law that lays out 
the policy priorities for the Commission in relation to gender equality’ (Kantola 2010, 7) but is often 
criticised by feminist scholars because such methods rarely result in any real structural change in 
gender relations in the member states. 
4 Below-replacement level fertility refers to fertility rates which are below the so-called replacement 
level, 2.1 children per woman in her lifetime. A 2.1 fertility rate is necessary in order to maintain the 
current size of the population. A fertility rate slightly above 2.1 is deemed optimal for economic 
growth. According to Eurostat (2011), the fertility rate of the total population of the European Union 
in 2006 was 1.52 children, with lowest fertility in Eastern and Southern European countries like the 
Czech Republic (1.33), Italy (1.32), Poland (1.27), Romania and Slovenia (1.31), Slovakia (1.24), 
and Spain (1.38). Iceland (2.08), Ireland (1.93), France (2.00), Finland (1.84), Norway (1.90), Sweden 
(1.85) and the United Kingdom (1.84) have the highest fertility rates. 
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